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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 18, 2006, CNET News went live from their bureau in Linden
with an interview of Anshe Chung.' Chung, a millionaire real estate magnate, had
recently appeared on the cover of Business Week and earned comparisons to
Trump and Rockefeller.2 Before she could answer a question about her business,
the interview was disrupted by a parade of giant, wriggling phalluses.'
Ordinarily, such a spectacle would defy the laws of physics-but laws do not
apply to Linden in an ordinary way. Linden is, in a physically literal sense, only a
computer program, and Anshe Chung a computer character or "avatar., 4 Chung's
real estate empire was built from coding that does not exist apart from a "virtual
world" (VW) called Second Life.' Chung's bank account, however, was
grounded in the real world of dollars, and her image transcended Second Life to
grace the cover of Business Week because she earned over $1 million by selling
land that existed only in the fantasy space of a VW.6 Chung was the face of an
emerging marketplace.
Eventually, the parade of phalluses stopped on its own accord, and onlookers
were treated to something worse. Photos of Ailin Graef, the human player behind
the avatar Anshe Chung, drifted through the interview site like snowflakes; they
had been altered to portray Graef holding a giant phallus.7 For a moment, the
fourth wall of Second Life was shattered. It was clear to the residents of Linden
what had happened. The digital attack was obviously the handiwork of griefers,
intentionally disruptive players who are sometimes described as the "barbarians,"
"psychotics," or "terrorists" of VWs.'
1. Daniel Terdiman, CNET to Interview 'Second Life' Land Baron Anshe Chung, CNET NEWS, Dec. 18,
2006, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-6144558-7.html [hereinafter Terdiman, Anshe Chung] (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Bettina M. Chin, Regulating Your Second Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REV.
1303, 1306 (2007); Julian Dibbell, Mutilated Furries, Flying Phalluses: Put the Blame on Griefers, the
Sociopaths of the Virtual World, WIRED MAG., Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.wired.com/ganing/virtualworlds/
magazine/ 6-02/mf.goons (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. Stephen Hutcheon, Second Life Miscreants Stage Members-Only Attack, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/good-grief-bad-vibesl2006/12/21/1166290662836.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). Footage of the attack has circulated on the Internet ever since, despite
Chung's complaints and the threat of legal action. Id. Daniel Terdiman, The Legal Rights to Your 'Second Life'
Avatar, CNET NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1047_3-6147700.html?part=rss&tag=2547-l_3-
0-20&subj=news [hereinafter Terdiman, Legal Rights] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Hutcheon, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Terdiman, Anshe Chung, supra note 1.
7. Terdiman, Legal Rights, supra note 3.
8. JESSICA MULLIGAN & BRIDGErrE PATROVSKY, DEVELOPING ONLINE GAMES: AN INSIDER'S GUIDE
218 (2003); Dibbell, supra note 2.
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The attack on Chung's interview illustrates a significant tension in VWs.
VWs are increasingly used "for far more than play"; 9 they support communities
and economic activity.' ° VWs share an uncertain boundary with the real world,
which creates regulatory challenges for both." Although griefing attacks occur in
the context of play, a real-world cognate to a griefing attack would be a node of
tort and criminal liability. 2 Griefing attacks may inflict financial and emotional
injury that spill over into a player's real life," and it is only a matter of time
before a plaintiff attempts to redress one of these injuries in court. When that day
comes, the plaintiff will find himself in the position of challenging conduct that
occurred in what many people would call a game.
VWs are play spaces, and should remain so lest they become "just another
extension of the real world."'' 4 Griefing attacks are generally in-world nuisances
that are best dealt with by VW administrators. The law may, however, ultimately
guarantee the integrity of VWs as play spaces. Griefing attacks that spill out of
the play conceit, and into the real world, may be addressed through real-world
law. Drawing the distinction between nonjusticiable nuisance and justiciable
offense is the subject of this Comment.
Part II is an introduction to VWs as communities and markets. Next, Part III
examines the phenomenon of griefing in VWs. Part IV explores the current VW
system of exclusive in-world regulation and concludes that it fails to deter or
redress the harms inflicted by griefing attacks. Part V examines the intersection
of griefing attacks and the "magic circle" of VWs and argues injuries that are
consistent with the magic circle should not be actionable under real-world law. 5
To determine the applicability of the "magic circle," would-be regulators should
balance a player's interest in pursuing a legitimate game objective against the
other player's reasonable expectations of conduct under the license agreement
Finally, Parts VI and VII consider possible remedies for harms against which the
play conceit does not. Part VI suggests that the values of VWs justify the
9. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 293, 305 (2004); Jack
M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck Introduction to THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS
3 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
10. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & John Crowley, Napster's Second Life?: The Regulatory
Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1775, 1788-90 (2006) (discussing the development of virtual
markets and the economic permeability of VWs and the real world).
It. Id.
12. See Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Rule of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 62 (2008) (describing "fantasy crimes," or acts which would clearly be criminal in the real
world but not in the fantasy space of VWs).
13. ToM BOELLSTORFF, COMING OF AGE IN SECOND LIFE: AN ANTHROPOLOGIST EXPLORES THE
VIRTUALLY HUMAN 188 (2008).
14. Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 19, 27 (2004).
15. The "magic circle" marks the privileged social space of a game. As every child knows, the rules of
play sometimes trump the rules outside of the game. See generally Jesper Juul, Keynote Address at the
Philosophy of Computer Games Conference: The Magic Circle and the Puzzle Piece (2008) (transcript available
at http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2008/2455/pdf/digarecOl_03.pdf) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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extension of principles of criminal law to griefing attacks. Part VII concludes that
limited extension of tort liability in VWs is consistent with the play conceit, if
not practical, and provides compensatory mechanisms for the worst attacks.
II. WELCOME TO THE (VIRTUAL) WORLD
A. Play Communities
Physically, VWs are computer programs. 6 All that "actually happens" in a
VW is an exchange of electronic transmissions between a host server and a
player's computer.' 7 The information infrastructure creates the room for a social
environment centered on play. The play of a VW may be unstructured or highly
structured.' 8 Structured VWs present players with predetermined objectives.' 9 For
example, World of Warcraft offers players fixed quests and opportunities for
combat. 20 Unstructured VWs, or "social worlds" like Second Life, are essentially
like "playing with LEGOs online," filtered through the experience of a social
networking site.2' In these VWs, game designers do not define the environment or
objectives of play so much as enable the players to do So. 22 Structured or not,
VWs are marketed and sold as games.23
When a player purchases the program to run a VW, he or she buys access to
a simulated, persistent environment that is as much a game as a place. 24 VWs
continue in the absence of players; the program behind a VW "remembers the
location of people and things, as well as the ownership of objects" and creates the
illusion of continuity. If VWs are games, they are games without winners or
16. See Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 415, 417-18 (2008)
(describing the "physical perspective" on VWs, which focuses on what "actually happens"). From the
perspective the player, however, logging on to a VW amounts to entering a virtual environment. Id. VWs
evolved from online games and inherited their simulated environments. Id; see Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra
note 12, at 21-23 (describing the evolution of VWs from text-based games to immersive graphic environments).
17. See Kerr, supra note 16, at 418 (describing the physical process of one's personal computer
connecting to a server over the Internet).
18. Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4
(2007).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Terdiman, Legal Rights, supra note 3; see also Leonard T. Nuara et al., No Man Is an Island, Not
Even in a Virtual World, 943 PL/PAT 523, 535 (2008) ("[Many] of the most popular [VWs] are more fairly
characterized as social networking sites ... .
22. Camp, supra note 18, at 4.
23. Betsy Book, Moving Beyond the Game: Social Virtual Worlds, Paper Presented at State of Play
Conference, New York Law School (Oct. 2004), at 11, available at http://www.virtualworldsreview.
com/papers/BBook_- SoP2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
24. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 300.
25. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian
Frontier, 2 THE GRUTER INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS ON LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1,
6 (2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol2/issl/artI [hereinafter Castronova, Virtual
Worlds].
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losers in the sense that the play is ongoing. A player's short term objectives may
be frustrated, but he only "loses" if he withdraws from the play community or
stops paying the subscription fees that most providers charge.'
VWs support large play communities. Thousands of players may
simultaneously share a virtual environment.27 "Millions of people spend a large
portion of their waking lives in virtual worlds. 28 Over 20 million people
participate in VWs, and by 2011 roughly 80 percent of Internet users are
projected to have virtual identities.29 The simulated space of WOW had roughly
11 million residents as of October 28, 2008-approximately the same as Cuba.3 °
"Avatars", or graphic proxies, provide players with an opportunity to
purposefully project an identity of their choosing, mediate both social interaction
and business in VW communities.3' Players may form powerful attachments to
virtual communities.32 Behind every avatar there is a real person, and the venue
of VWs does not trivialize their social interaction.
3
B. Play Markets, Real Money
Despite their background in play, many VWs function "more as extensions
of reality than escapes from it." 34 The putative economies of VWs are not fantasy.
26. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 300.
27. Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 25, at 8.
28. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
29. Edward Castronova, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Real-Money Trade in the Products of Synthetic
Economies, 8 INFO (Oct. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=917124 [hereinafter Castronova, Cost-
Benefit Analysis] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Erin Anderssen, Frontier Justice: Can
Virtual Worlds Be Civilized?, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.theglobeandmail.comlservletlstory/
RTGAM.20070907.wvirtualo908/BNStory/Technologyhome?pageRequested=aIIVW (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
30. Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft Surpasses 11 Million Subscribers World
Wide (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.blizzard.comus/press/081028.htil (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
CIA.gov, Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook: Cuba, https://www.cia.gov/library/publicationsthe-
world-factbook/geos/cu.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
31. See generally Wikipedia, Avatar (Virtual Reality), http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilAvatar_(virtual
_reality) (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining "Avatar" as an
incarnation of a real-world individual inside a virtual space). Players grow attached to their avatars and "may
invest a great deal of time and effort in building up their identity and their reputation." Jack M. Balkin, Virtual
Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2066 (2004).
32. Jack Balkin, Commodifying Virtual Worlds, http://balkin.blogspot.comV2005/01/commodifying-
virtual-worlds.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (players "form virtual
communities that are immensely valuable to them").
33. See Ralph Koster, A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars, (Aug. 27, 2000), http://www.
raphkoster.com/gaming/playerrights.shtml (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[Avatars] are the
manifestation of actual people in an online medium, and ... their utterances, actions, thoughts, and emotions
should be considered to be as valid as the utterances, actions, thoughts, and emotions of people in any other
forum, venue, location, or space."). But see Wikipedia, Internet Bot, http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Intemetbot
(last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing "bots," computer programs
that may simulate a human player).
34. Book, supra note 23, at 11.
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Some unstructured VWs, like Second Life, are openly marketed as economic
platforms where trade is encouraged." Even structured VWs have become
36
platearly aser1
economic platforms despite strict rules to the contrary. As early as 1987, players
in VWs began to participate in real-money trades (RMTs) to exchange items in
the game for outside money.37 In EverQuest, for example, a player willing to part
with forty dollars outside the game may outfit his avatar with a "blood-bladed
dagger."38 RMTs are the norm within the culture of most VWs. 39 Moreover, the
in-world currency of many VWs is a far cry from monopoly money. Some VW
currencies have an informal "black market" exchange rate with the dollar, while
other currencies, like Second Life's Linden, have formal exchange rates that are
regulated by game administrators.4°
The scale of economic activity in VWs is difficult to measure or dismiss. In
2005, the global level of RMTs was over $100 million and by some estimates as
high as $1 billion.4' Even a figure that falls between these two extremes, such as
$300 million, is double what VWs themselves generated in annual subscription
revenue in 2002.42 In 2001, Norrath alone, the on-line environment of EverQuest,
was estimated to be as economically productive as the sovereign nation
Bulgaria.43 VW markets are not a trivial phenomenon," and no one knows better
35. Terdiman, Legal Rights, supra note 3 (describing "the general theory (in Second Life) is that you
own what you create.").
36. See id. ("In most cases, publishers of online games include in their terms of service a prohibition on
so-called real-money trades"); see also World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, 7, http://worldo
fwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
("NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY HEREIN, YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND
AGREE THAT YOU SHALL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP OR OTHER PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE
ACCOUNT, AND YOU FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT ALL RIGHTS IN AND TO
THE ACCOUNT ARE AND SHALL FOREVER BE OWNED BY AND INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF
BLIZZARD."). Rules aside, virtual merchants trade World of Warcraft items for dollars at http:://www.ige.com.
37. Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 29, at 2.
38. Mike Musgrove, Virtual Games Create a Real World Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, at Al.
39. Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 29, at 14; see also RICHARD A. BARTLE, THE
PITFALLS OF VIRTUAL PROPERTY 3 (Themis Group 2004), available at http://www.themis-group.
com/uploads/Pitfalls%20of%2OVirtual%20Property.pdf ("[Trading] in virtual property is already an established
phenomenon.").
40. Daniel Terdiman, Virtual Gaming's Elusive Exchange Rates, CNET NEWS, Aug. 5, 2005,
http://news.cnet.com/Virtual-gamings-elusive-exchange-rates/2100-1043-3-5820137.htm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
("Although participants purchase virtual property using the virtual currency of 'lindens,' lindens themselves are
bought and sold for real U.S. dollars. Linden maintains a currency exchange that sets an exchange rate between
lindens and U.S. dollars. Third parties, including ebay.com, also provide additional currency exchanges.");
Second Life, Currency Exchange, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency (last visited Dec. 25, 2008) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the current Linden exchange rate).
41. Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 29, at 2-4.
42. Julian Dibbell, The Unreal Estate Boom, WIRED MAG., Jan. 2003, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/ 11.01/gaming.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
43. Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 25, at 44-47 (Castronova's subsequent studies lowered the
estimate, finding the cumulative gross domestic product of all VWs closer to Namibia); Mark Ward, Virtual
Gaming Worlds Overtake Namibia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiltechnology/
3570224.stm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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than the members of virtual communities. The synthetic economies of VWs have
produced real-world fortunes. Anshe Chung accumulated over $1 million through
trading land that only virtually exists.45 Moreover, VWs have spawned real-world
companies, like IGE, whose only business is to "farm" and "trade" virtual items
for RMTs.4
C. Playing Regulator
VWs are increasingly complicated games that may also function as
communities and markets. They call for complicated rules, and the governance of
these environments is a work in progress. Laws in the real world do not hold
designers responsible for policing their VWs. 4 7 They do not need to. Game
administrators take responsibility for policing and ordering VWs by virtue of
imposing unilateral regulations.4 ' Because VWs are computer programs, coding
is a regulatory tool. 49 Game administrators can alter the program that evokes the
VW and make whatever changes they wish to the game environment. 0 Coding
can, for example, filter the language used in a VW and prohibit profanity. 5
Regulating conduct in a VW is, however, not merely a matter of perfecting
computer coding. Coding alone cannot control virtual conduct;52 it is a blunt tool.
In Second Life, for example, coding grants private landowners enough control
over their land to prevent many forms of anti-social attacks, at the cost of
preventing many legitimate in-game activities.
44. Ward, supra note 43.
45. Rob Hof, Second Life's First Millionaire, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2006, available at http://www.
usinessweek.comthethread/techbeatlarchives/2006/11/secondlifes fi.htmI (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
46. BARTLE, supra note 39, at 2.
47. See Walaika Haskins, Who Polices Virtual Worlds?, LINuX INSIDER, July 31, 2008,
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64002.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Congress has
said, for the most part, they are not responsible for policing their own environments. It's totally up to them to
decide how little or how much they want to do." (quoting Eric Goldman)).
48. Bartle, supra note 14, at 19.
49. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2049.
50. Id.
51. Blizzard Support, Harassment Overview, http://us.blizzard.com/support/article.xml?articleld=20455
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
52. Bartle, supra note 14, at 25-26 ("[There] are some things that virtual world developers simply cannot
stop using software alone.., a virtual world's code cannot hope to trap... antisocial behavior-even though it
arises inside the virtual world.").
53. Posting of dandelion to http://metaverse. acidzen.org/2007/how-to-kill-a-griefer (Dec. 4, 2008) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Mike Sellers, The Solution to Griefing Is ... the FBI?, TERRA
NOVA, Dec. 21, 2005, http://terranova.blogs.com/terranova/2005/12/the-solutionto.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing how changes to script options meant to stifle griefing attacks prevented
legitimate in-game activity and were subsequently abandoned).
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Beyond coding, game administrators regulate VWs through rules of play and
contractual agreements.' These rules are memorialized in end user license
agreements (EULA) or term of service agreements (TOS)." Players must assent
to these agreements before accessing the VW for the first time, typically through
clicking "I agree" as they begin play. These so-called "click-wrap" contracts
have proven controversial, if enforceable, in other contexts. 6 The legality of VW
EULAs and TOS contracts has not been definitively litigated, though some
commentators suggest that EULAs are as unenforceable as contracts of
adhesion. 7 The legal status of the "virtual property" at the heart of RMTs has not
been litigated, but EULAs presume to address the issue. The industry standard is
to disclaim any and all player property interests through EULAs." If courts
recognize virtual property as an important interest, EULAs may ultimately prove
unenforceable. 9 Some VW designers, notably Linden Labs, expressly recognize
in their EULAs players' rights in virtual property. These rights are, however,
terminable upon a violation. 6°
Designers have struggled to find enforcement mechanisms for VWs and the
regime of code and contracting has yet to meet their inherent challenges.6 ' Game
administrators may write and enforce the "laws" in VWs, but not outside them,
and the border between VWs and the real world is increasingly difficult to draw.62
Some external legal regulation of VWs may be necessary to protect the interests
at stake in both VWs and the real world. However, those who desire regulation
the least are the griefers.63
54. Bartle, supra note 14, at 26.
55. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 309.
56. See Caspi v. Microsoft Networks, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (finding that an
MSN customer agreed to an arbitration clause in the TOS by clicking "I agree"); see also Scott v. Bell Atlantic
Corp., 726 N.YS.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding a click-wrap agreement valid despite the discrepancy
between hyperbolic web advertising and disclaimers accompanying the agreement).
57. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1047, 1083 (2005) ("[EULA] provisions
surpass the usual abuses of contracts of adhesion."); see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding the Second Life's TOS to be an adhesion contract and finding its arbitration clause
unenforceable due to procedural and substantive unconscionability, but not addressing the general validity of
other TOS clauses). But see Erez Reuvenai, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the
Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 290 (2007) ("EULAs are likely valid as a matter of contract law and enforceable
against a virtual-world participant who assents to the EULA by clicking 'OK' upon loading the game.").
58. See World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, 4-7, http://www.worldofwarcraft.
com/legal/termsofuse.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
WOW TOS] (reserving all rights and title to in-game content, including objects).
59. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2070.
60. Second Life, What Are IP Rights?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/iprights.Php (last visited Dec. 25,
2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
61. Mayer- Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1799.
62. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 2059 (noting the permeable boundary between game space and real
space in VWs).
63. BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF VIRTUAL
WORLDS 61 (2008).
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in. GRIEFERS
A. Grief Play
When the word "griefer" outgrows VWs, it will be a synonym for
spoilsport.64 Unlike players who may play disruptively on occasion or misbehave
in awkward virtual adolescence and later outgrow it, griefers are self-consciously
aware of their status as spoilsports. 6 They play to disrupt and ruin the play of
others,6 and their conscious objective is to disrupt and harass. 67 They do not so
much participate in the play conceit of VWs, so much as attack it.
Unlike a criminal who exploits a VW for financial advantage, a griefer "does
not profit in any way" from his actions.6 Unlike a legitimate player, a griefer
does not advance in-game objectives through their actions.69 Rather, for a griefer,
the attack and its fallout is reward enough.7° Their attacks are animated by an
ironic catchphrase that doubles as nihilistic philosophy: "the internet is serious
business., 7' Nothing that happens online is meaningful, or above a mean laugh-
especially those who think otherwise.
Though often attributable to individual malcontents, griefing is increasingly
not an "isolated nuisance., 73 Griefers gravitate into "guilds" of like-minded
64. See JOHAN HUIZINGA, HoMo LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 30 (Taylor &
Francis 2003) ("[Tjhe spoil-sport shatters the play-world itself. By withdrawing from the game he reveals that
relativity and fragility of the play-world in which he had temporarily shut himself with others. He robs play of
its illusion....").
65. See Holin Lin & Chuen-Tsai Sun, The 'White-eyed' Player Culture: Grief Play and Construction of
Deviance in MMORPGs, Proceedings of DiGRA 2005 Conference: Chanings View-Worlds in Play, 4 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
66. MULLIGAN & PATROVSKY, supra note 8, at 218; see also DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 61 (defining
"griefers" as players who "participate in virtual worlds and games for the sole purpose of causing mayhem and
disrupting other user's experiences" and "griefing" as "playing a game or participating in a virtual world simply
to cause grief for other players through harassment").
67. See Chek Yang Foo & Elina M. I. Koivisto, Grief Player Motivations, Paper Presented at Other
Players Conference 2 (2004), available at http://itu/dllop//proceedings.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (discussing the role of intent in defining grief play); Dibbell, supra note 2 (describing the conscious
objective of griefers as to "[shatter] the world of play itself'). But see Posting of Richard Bartle, What to Call a
Griefer, http://terranova.blogs.comlterra.nova/2007/10/what-to-call-a-.html (Oct. 23, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the broad use of "griefing" to describe unintentional acts); Eve Online
Support, Grief Play, http://support.eve-online.comlPageslKB/Article.aspx?id=336 (last visited Apr. 13. 2010)
[hereinafter Eve Online] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
68. Eve Online, supra note 67; see also Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar's Day in Court: A Proposal for
Obtaining Relief and Resolving Disputes in Virtual World Games, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, 69 (2007)
(describing a sham virtual property transaction in Second Life that defrauded players of $10,000).
69. Eve Online, supra note 67.
70. See Dibbell, supra note 2 (describing a common explanation of griefing as doing it for laughs, or
"lulz").
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Martin Davies, Garners Don't Want Any More Grief GUARDIAN, June 15, 2006, available at
http://www.uardian.co.uk/technology/2006/jun/15/games.guardianweeklytechnologysection2; see also BOELLTORFF,
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players, such as the "Goonswarm" and "Patriotic Nigras".74 Though griefers
make up a relatively small portion of virtual communities, perhaps three
percent, 75 they are concentrated and co-operative enough to wreak virtual havoc
with their attacks. The Patriotic Nigras, for example, at one point had at least 150
active members participating and cooperating in their attacks on Second Life.76
Griefers are increasingly less individual miscreants and more an alternative
internet culture, complete with its own "in-jokes, code words, taboos, and an
increasingly articulate sense of purpose."" In the sense that griefers are well
organized and have consistent, if deviant, behavioral codes, it may be fitting to
analogize them to virtual gangs.
Griefing was well known to virtual communities long before it was named.78
It may be an inevitable fact of virtual life. As the number of users in a computer
network increases, the "probability of [griefing] 'attacks' approaches certainty. 79
The number of ways to spoil the play of a VW are limited only by the VW itself
and the griefer's imagination. Increasingly, these methods take on legal
implications that threaten the status of VWs as play spaces more than the
commodification of virtual worlds themselves.
B. The Griefer's Tool Kit
A griefing attack may be described in three elements: a griefer commits an
intentional act in the VW, which causes other players to enjoy the game less, and
the griefer enjoys the act.8" This broad description glosses over the reality that
griefing attacks are not equally objectionable. Griefing attacks are most
objectionable when the harm they inflict transcends the game play of a VW.
VWs share an uncertain boundary with the real world, and harms inflicted in VW
play spaces may spill over into real life.8 ' Play-spoiling stunts give rise to legal
implications when there is more at stake than play.
The potential for a griefing attack to spill out of the VW and into a player's
life is limited by the physics of individual VWs and whatever situations the
setting griefers find in-game to exploit.82 In highly structured VWs, like
Toontown Online, griefers must be content to "spam" limited dialogue options
supra note 13, at 118-95 (discussing how griefing is not an individual act but connected to a "griefer community").
74. Dibbell, supra note 2.
75. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 246.
76. Dibbell, supra note 2.
77. Id.
78. See id. ("[Elven before it had a name, grieferlike behavior was familiar in prehistoric text-based
virtual worlds... where joyriding invaders visited "virtual rape" and similar offenses on the local populace.")
79. Sellers, supra note 53.
80. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 245.
81. Mayer-Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1789 (noting that VWs share a permeable
boundary with the real, despite attempts to limit spill-over).
82. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 1.
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and sabotage the game-related objectives of other players."3 Less structured VWs,
with more open socialization, create opportunities for communication based
harassment and abuse." Forms of real-world harassment easily translate in VWs
and may spill outside the game because VWs facilitate social environments."5
Griefing is a fact of virtual life in all VWs, but unstructured VWs like
Second Life are most vulnerable and present a new frontier in troublemaking
potential.86 In these VWs, the line between virtual and reality is most permeable,
and griefing has the most potential to inflict a harm that transcends play. Griefing
often amounts to defacing attacks on a player's in-game property.87 Griefers may
delete items or information from a player's virtual space or an avatar's
inventory.8 Alternately, griefers may exploit the open coding of certain VWs and
add code rather than delete it. In one notable example, griefers added digital fecal
matter and racially charged imagery to former presidential candidate John
Edward's Second Life campaign headquarters.89
The ultimate tool in the griefer's kit is the "denial of service" attack. The
denial of service attack is a hacking problem that transcends VWs to crash
computers or separate them from networks. 9° Griefers have discovered ways to
exploit the mechanics of VWs to launch denial of service attacks. In Second Life,
for example, griefers used the open coding of the VW to make self-replicating
objects that overloaded the servers and crashed the entire VW-the virtual
83. Robin Torres, Toontown Online Makes It Harder for Griefers, MASSIVELY, July 6, 2008, available
at http://www.massively.com/2008/07/06/toontown-online-makes-it-harder-for-griefers/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing the spamming of chat options like "You stink!" and objective spoiling acts
like quitting groups as play begins to sabotage them).
84. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 2063 (arguing that because all VW conduct is essentially speech,
communication based torts like harassment may apply in VWs). For example, World of Warcraft's Barren's
chat is a venue legendary for its offensive content. See Posting of Timothy Burke to http://terranova.
blogs.comlterranova/2006/01/littletimmy_ub.html (Jan. 4, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
("Any of us who've played [VWs] actively have a long personal catalogue of... griefing. Any given night
reading Barrens chat... is like an encyclopedia of all the dysfunctions a modem human being can display.").
85. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 4.
86. Nicole Girard, Griefer Madness: Terrorizing Virtual Worlds, LINUX INSIDER, Sept. 19, 2007,
http://www.technewsworld.com/rsstory/59401.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Dibbell, supra
note 2.
87. Eric Reuters, Rosedale Discloses FBI Griefing Probe to Congress, SECOND LIFE INSIDER, Apr. 1,
2008, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2008/04/01/rosedale-discloses-fbi-griefing-probe-t-congress (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
88. See Simon Canning, ABC'S Virtual Site 'Griefed', AUSTRALIAN, May 23, 2007, available at
http://www.news.com.aulentertainment/story/0,23663,2178 0 235-7486,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing the aftermath of a griefing attack on ABC Island, a prominent commercial site in Second
Life, as a "bombed, cratered mess," where griefers "obliterated almost every object on the site").
89. Allison Fass, Sex, Pranks and Reality, FORBES, July 7, 2007, available at http://members.forbes.
comlforbes/2007/0702/048.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Edwards' campaign hoped to use
Second Life as platform for connecting with voters-instead the campaign headquarters became a griefer's
canvass. Id.
90. Joseph Lo, Denial of Service or "Nuke Attacks", http://www.ircbelp.org/irchelp/nuke/ (last visited
Dec. 25, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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equivalent of sacking Rome.9' These techniques describe the current scope of
griefing. As VWs develop, griefers will find new tools to exploit.
C. Griefing's Impact: The Wages of Grief
After an infamous career among the Patriotic Nigras, a griefer known as
"N3x15" issued a public apology to the residents of Second Life in which he
acknowledged that he had "undoubtedly caused untold amounts of emotional and
monetary harm... most likely repeatedly." 92 This uncharacteristic expression of
remorse offers insight on the impact of griefing. Griefing attacks are meant to
ruin play, with the foreseeable consequence of violating a player's emotional
integrity; thus, griefing attacks often result in emotional injuries.
93
Moreover, inasmuch as VWs are economic forums, griefing attacks also
inflict financial injuries.94 Griefing attacks can cause measureable economic
harms.95 At the very least, denial of service attacks harm the synthetic economics
of VWs96 and create lost business opportunities for players and corporate entities
alike. In Second Life, for example, anti-commercialization griefers responded to
the unwelcome presence of an American Apparel virtual store by shooting the
store's customers with avatar-defacing virtual guns.97 Following the attack,
American Apparel closed up shop in Second Life because sales were not
significant enough to justify griefing as a price of doing business.98 Operating a
business in Second Life has been compared to "the equivalent of running a field
marketing program in Iraq," in large part because of griefing.99
Griefing attacks against virtual property take an economic toll. Granted,
financial and property harms in VWs are less serious than their real-world
91. Dibbell, supra note 2 (This denial of service attack exploited tools provided by Linden Labs to SL
all users); see also Sellers, supra note 53 (Linden Labs changed Second Life's scripting in response to these
attacks, but changed them back in response to the backlash from players who relied on the scripts for legitimate
in-game activities).
92. Pixeleen Mistral, N3xJ5 Ashamed of PN Griefer Thug Life: Notorious Griefer Issues Public
Apology to S[econd] L[ife] Residents and Linden Lab, ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Dec. 14, 2008, available at
http://foo.secondlifeherad.com/sih/2008/12/rl3x 15-no-more-pn-griefer-thug-life.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
93. BOELLSTORFF, supra note 13, at 188; see also JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND
PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 17 (1998) (describing the emotional trauma experienced by the victims of a
griefing attack).
94. See BOELLSTORFF, supra note 13, at 118-95 (stating that financial harm is a consequence of griefing
attacks that disrupt business opportunities).
95. See Dibbell, supra note 2 ("[I]t's anti-civilization ... it's wrong ... it costs me hundreds of US
dollars.").
96. See Nuara et al., supra note 21, at 540 (characterizing the prohibition of conduct in violation of a
TOS as "essential to the maintenance of an orderly [virtual] society and thus, an effective environment for
commerce; not unlike the real world").
97. Fass, supra note 89.
98. Anderssen, supra note 29.
99. Id.
940
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cognates; virtual property is potentially infinite and more easily repaired than real
property.'"° Nonetheless, removing a griefer's handiwork can be time consuming
and expensive, and it is not difficult to accidentally delete virtual property with a
value of hundreds of dollars.'0
Additionally, griefing damages a VW's game environment by driving away
players and their money. '°2 Administrators invest significant resources in
response to griefing attacks,0 3 which are the source of up to twenty-five percent
of customer support calls to VW administrators.' 4 Currently, the regulatory
scheme of VWs does not provide many options for dealing with these
complaints.
IV. IN-WORLD REGULATION
Presently, griefing attacks are addressed only by game administrators
through coding and contracts.'05 However, informal social norms serve as the first
line of defense against harassment and griefing attacks.'1 6 Alternately, VW
communities often develop their own enforcement mechanisms for play related
conduct. Neither method of in-world regulation has proven successful in
confronting the challenges posed by griefing attacks.
A. Informal Norms
The rules of a VW are best understood by examining how the game is
played."' 7 Peer pressure may be a more significant influence on conduct than
formal rules, and some norms of player conduct are established by informal
social responses, as opposed to carefully crafted codes."'0 Yet, the virtual
anonymity of VWs works against the development of social norms. The ubiquity
of griefers in VWs may correlate to the anonymity of such environments and the
100. Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 72-73.
101. Anderssen, supra note 29.
102. MULLIGAN & PATROVSKY, supra note 8, at 218
103. See Steven B. Davis, The Cost of Insecurity-Griefing: from Anonymity to Accountability,
http://www.secureplay.com/cheating/griefing-in-games.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) ('The cost of managing griefing can grow rapidly for a game service provider -
causing the problem to be neglected, redirecting staff from other assignments, or increasing the total staff cost
for the game. For a small game, these costs can be the difference between success and failure. For a large game,
these costs are a continual drag on the bottom line.").
104. Davies, supra note 73.
105. See Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 60 (stating VW harassment is dealt with by game
administrators).
106. See Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Product Liability and Other
Issues, 5 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. POL'Y 2, 16 (2005) ("Most of the control exercised in. human societies is
informal.").
107. Kerr, supra note 16, at 422.
108. Charlie Devereux, Anarchy On-line, CNN, Aug. 24, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/TECHl08/
23/virtual.bullying (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Balkin, supra note 31, at 2069.
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weak social norms for enforcing behavior.' °9 The scope of VWs limits the
development of social norms. Anthropologists theorize that one hundred and fifty
is the maximum number of people that can maintain a social relationship before
"civil society breaks down because individuals no longer feel a connection with
other members of the group."" Amidst thousands of virtual strangers represented
by avatars, many players may not feel a sense of community. The mechanics of
strong VW communities, including "friends lists, reputation stats, and other
features both to tie players more closely to the game and create an environment
that reduces anonymity for misbehaving players," may restrict the prevalence of
griefing by promoting stronger social norms."' Some who have considered the
problem of VW social interaction conclude virtual communities should be
segmented into smaller numbers so players are exposed and subject to
community norms."' This would, however, limit one of the most striking features
of VWs: massive interactivity.
Moreover, greater exposure to social norms is not likely to deter griefers.
Griefers are already exposed to their own parallel development of social norms,"3
which insulate them from the disapproval of virtual communities. Eliciting
disapproval from mainstream virtual communities is the main goal of the
griefer's play. Social punishments do not deter conduct if the user is not as
invested in his reputation as the "mainstream user base."' 14 Ultimately, social
norms do not provide social cohesion in VWs or limit misbehavior." 5 Rather,
social norms provide the context for griefing attacks. Further, in the
aforementioned case of the anti-commercialization griefers who attacked
American Apparel, griefing might serve as an assertion of the norms of play. In
other words, griefing may be a struggle to define an emerging set of social norms
within VWs.
B. Community Rules
Community-created enforcement mechanisms for confronting griefers are
more deliberate than informal social responses. Players may join collectively to
pool and share "expertise, resources, moral support and the motivation to prevent
109. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 188.
110. Devereux, supra note 108. For more on "Dunbar's number theory," see R.I.M Dunbar, Co-
Evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans, 16 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 681-
735, available at http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/65/bbsOO000565-00/bbs.dunbar.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that biology limits the number of stable social relationships to 150 at
a time).
111. Davies, supra note 73.
112. Devereux, supra note 108.
113. Dibbell, supra note 2.
114. Mayer-Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1799-1800.
115. See generally Phillip Stoup, The Development and Failure of Social Norms in Second Life, 58
DUKE L.J. 311 (2008) (arguing that Second Life will fail to develop social norms that will maximize resident
welfare, thus necessitating formal regulatory schemes).
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and withstand attacks."" 6 Taken to an extreme, this strategy produces "anti-
griefing vigilantes," or players who report griefers to the game administrators and
take in-game measures to stop on-going attacks.1 7 The authority of vigilantes to
act, as well as their relationship with game administrators, is uncertain."' These
groups pose problems of their own and are often difficult to distinguish from the
griefers they battle.9 However well organized, "strike-back techniques are not a
desirable way to maintain order in cyberspace."' 20
Alternately, in-world local governments and regulatory bodies comprised of
players may be well-suited for confronting the regulatory challenges posed by
griefers. 2 1 Yet the punishments available under this approach, such as "public
,,122 lkl
shaming and direct retribution, are not likely to deter an anonymous griefer
who takes pride in disruption and believes the "internet is serious business.' 23
Moreover, they cannot address harms outside the game. Because griefers have no
in-game goals, preventing and punishing their behavior through penalties
associated with in-game conduct or participation is useless. Ultimately,
community enforcement mechanisms face many of the same problems as game
administrator enforcement mechanisms.'24
116. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 106, at 31.
117. Peppermint Fizz, The Justice League of Second Life: Bad Boyz Ignore the Lindens-But Stand
Down for Batman, June 10, 2007, ALPHAVILLE HERALD, http://www.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2007/
06/the-justice lea.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
118. See Catherine Holahan, The Dark Side of Second Life, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 11, 2006, available
at http://www.businessweek.comltechnology/contentlnov2006/tc20061121_727243.htm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the various issues to be addressed before "grassroots justice" can succeed
in VWs).
119. See Nikola Shirakawa, Former JLU Member Speaks Out: Anti-Griefer Justice League Unlimited
Threatens Privacy and Acts Like Griefers, ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Aug. 4, 2007, http://www.secondlifeherald.
com/slh/2007/08/former-jlu-memb.htnl (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing security and
harassment concerns raised by anti-griefing groups and observing that "the problem with anti-griefers is that
they always turn into griefers themselves").
120. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 106, at 31.
121. See Alemi, supra note 68, at 93-94 (proposing a two-tiered virtual justice system, with in-world
courts for in-game conduct and real-world courts as a venue of last resort for dealing with virtual crimes and
torts); see also Local Government Study Group, Benefits of Local Government in Virtual Worlds,
http://Igsg.wetpaint.com/page/Benefits+of+ioca+govemance+in+virtual+worlds?t=anon (last visited Mar. 1,
2009) [hereinafter Local Government] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (advocating regulation by in-
world local governments to deal with griefers).
122. See Alemi, supra note 68, at 51 (arguing that community enforcement mechanisms offer strong
regulatory mechanisms).
123. Dibbell, supra note 2.
124. The challenges that griefing poses for VW self-regulation receive a detailed examination in Julian
Dibbell's chronicle of the early VW LambdaMoo. See DIBBELL, supra note 93. LambdaMoo faced less
complicated challenges than modem VWs. It was not party to RMTS. Game administrators enacted a regulatory
experiment in virtual Athenian democracy. Id. at 18. Administrators attempted to make no decisions regarding
the social life of the community, but rather enact the communities' will. Id. This regulatory scheme was tested
by a griefer who "sexually assaulted" others players by means of a voodoo-doll script. Id. at 13. Enacting, or
identifying the will of the community proved difficult. Eventually a wizard took it upon himself to summarily
ban the griefer, thereby creating nearly as much controversy as the "sexual assault." Id. at 25. In response to the
attack, LambdaMoo's designers refined the social order with the addition of general ban commands to eject
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C. Formal Rules
When informal social norms fail, formal social control may be exercised
against violators of proscriptive rules.'2 The proscriptive rules of play in VWs
are memorialized in the EULAs, or "social contracts" of VWs, and are enforced
by game administrators. "6 In the absence of real-world authority on the matter,
EULAs are functionally the law of VWs. Anything not explicitly forbidden under
the EULA is acceptable within a VW, while anything forbidden is considered an
offense. 7 If the EULA is law, then griefers are the violent felons of VWs.1Th
The techniques griefers employ in their attacks are generally breaches of
EULA and TOS and thus are grounds for sanction. 9 For example, the
proscriptive rules of Second Life are formalized in the Community Standards,
which articulate the "Big Six" behaviors that result in a suspension or ban.'3° The
Big Six include intolerance, harassment, assault, disclosure, indecency, and
disturbing the peace.'3 ' Griefing breaches the Big Six as a matter of course.
3 2
However, in-world enforcement mechanisms are not well-equipped to deal with a
"berserker" characters and an ad hoc mediation system for resolving disputes. Id. The system was tested, and
proved unsatisfactory, when a respected community member was accused of harassment. Id. at 82. Dibbell
observed that "no matter how close the mediation system came to procedural perfection, it might never quite
feel adequate to managing the complex webs of interrelationship that put the reality in virtual reality." Id. at
110.
125. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 106, at 16.
126. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2049.
127. Kerr, supra note 16, at 422.
128. Tateru Nino, Who Are the Griefers?, SECOND LIFE INSIDER, Nov. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.secondlifeinsider.coffL2006/11/03/who-are-the-griefers (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
129. See generally Second Life, Terms of Service 4.1, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php. (last
visited March 3, 2009) [hereinafter Second Life TOS] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (prohibiting
conduct "that is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, causes tort, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous,
invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable"); see WOW TOS,
supra note 58 9(B)-(vi) (prohibiting "unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar,
obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable" and forbidding players to
"[h]arass, threaten, stalk, embarrass, or cause distress, unwanted attention, or discomfort to any user of the
game").
130. Second Life, Community Standards, http://secondlife.comlcorporatelcs.php (last visited Apr. 14,
2010) [hereinafter Community Standards] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
131. Id.
132. Id. For example, the griefing attack on Anshe Chun arguably violated all of the "Big Six."
Intolerance is demonstrated by "derogatory or demeaning language or images in reference to another Resident's
race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual orientation." Id. The photo-shopped images of Chung holding a
phallus are animated by gender animus. Harassment may be demonstrated by conduct "likely to cause
annoyance or alarm." Id. The penis bomb meets this standard by any definition. Assault occurs when a player
"uses scripted objects which singularly or persistently target another Resident in a manner which prevents their
enjoyment of Second Life." Id. This is a fair description of the self-spawning items that disrupted Chung's
interview. A photo of Ailin Graef was published during the course of the attack, which may constitute a breach
of disclosure. Id. The attack involved graphic depictions of sexual organs in a public area, hence it was
indecent. Id. Finally, the attack disrupting a public event, and would be a breach of the peace under community
standards. Id.
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griefer's breaches.'33 The rules of play are enforced through exclusion. Game
administrators may temporarily or permanently ban an account from the VW for
violations of the rules of play.' 4 In structured VWs that rely on a subscription
model, like World of Warcraft, a ban is a heavy penalty. A player who invests
months of game play in acquiring in-game skills, items, and reputation is unlikely
to risk it all for the thrill of griefing if he anticipates a ban.'35 Yet, "[g]riefers will
pay to grief, if it comes to that.'
36
VWs are large and poorly supervised, 3 7 and it is widely acknowledged that
bans are an ineffective enforcement mechanism.' 38 To facilitate the supervisory
process, some game administrators provide reporting mechanisms for violations
of the rules of play. 39 However, even when a griefer comes to the attention of the
authorities, they are generally only banned if the intent to disrupt is explicitly
demonstrated.' ° Further, imposing a ban often has a negligible impact on
griefers, who see banning as a "badge of honor.' 4' A griefer who is not
eventually banned is doing it wrong.
More significantly, bans do not deter or prevent griefer attacks. Though VWs
rely on exclusion to enforce the rules of play, they also rely on inclusion-the
more players a VW boasts the more successful it is. In many unstructured VWs,
notably Second Life, accounts are free and largely disposable. 4 2 Griefing
flourishes in the anonymity afforded by free accounts.'4 3  When a game
133. See Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 44 ("It is unclear how effectively this system deals
with in-world miscreants, better known as 'griefers.' Anecdotal postings on various websites express
dissatisfaction with Second Life's inability to discourage violations of the Community Standards and Terms of
Service.").
134. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2049; see also Second Life TOS, supra note 129, at 1 4.1 ("Any
violation ... may result in immediate and permanent suspension or cancellation of your Account.").
135. See Mayer-Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1793 ("Expulsion as an enforcement
mechanism is effective because participants in virtual worlds incur significant social and financial costs when
they are forced to leave."). Note that in VWs with free accounts, this logic does not apply.
136. Nino, supra note 128.
137. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 191.
138. Sellers, supra note 53.
139. See Second Life TOS, supra note 129 (suggesting that residents report violations with the Abuse
Reporter, a function in the basic game interface). Note that in Second Life, handling attacks that occur on
private property is left to the discretion of the property owner, who has tools to exclude the griefer from the
property. RICHARD MANSFIELD, How TO Do EVERYTHING WITH SECOND LIFE 27 (2007). Abuse reports may be
a potential griefing tool, in that false accusations may have potential reputational and financial consequences.
BOELLSTORFF, supra note 13, at 195.
140. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 246.
141. Id.
142. See Second Life, Membership Plans, http://secondlife.com/whatis/plans.php (last visited Apr. 14,
2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering information on Second Life membership plans,
including free accounts).
143. See Morris Vig, Griefing Must Stop NOW-And Linden Labs Can Stop It, http://secondarts.
wordpress.com/2007/11/13/griefing-must-stop-now-and-linden-lab-can-stop-it/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (proposing to fight griefing by eliminating user features, including coding
and free accounts in Second Life).
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administrator bans a griefer, the griefer can reappear with a new account in a
matter of minutes.1 A single griefer may use and discard hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of accounts.' 45 Moreover, so long as there is one griefer in the VW
who can deliver "griefer packs" to other players, bans cannot stop ongoing
attacks. Griefers have demonstrated the ability to re-launch attacks within
minutes of being banned.' 6 Griefers may even use other players' accounts to
launch attacks.
In-world enforcement is desirable because it forecloses the necessity of real-
world enforcement. However, in-world enforcement cannot deter griefers or
prevent griefing attacks from developing into potentially "real" harms. Bans
neither remedy the in-world injury caused by griefing nor the spill over injury to
the real life of the victim. If legal remedies are available to the victims of a
griefing attack, the real-world injury should dictate the choice of remedies. The
type of harm suffered in play is, however, in large part determined by the specific
game a griefer disrupts.
V. THE RULES OF PLAY
A. Injuries In and Out of Games
The first step in extending existing principles of law to griefing attacks is to
identify a cognizable injury. In-game injuries may be addressed with internal
remedies, which VW administrators are in the best position to apply.' 47 However,
injuries suffered in VWs can spill over into a player's real life, and game
administrators are not in a position to redress such harms. 48 Real-world law
should at least be considered as an option when an injury transcends the VW and
is not otherwise redressable
49
Determining whether a griefing attack creates an internal or external injury is
no simple task, because both may extend from a single transaction. Consider the
example of a griefer who conmmits "virtual rape" against another player's avatar.
The griefer obviously does not physically violate the other player.5 All that has
144. Eric Schmidt, Griefers: Harbingers of "In-World" Torts?, TECH LAWFORUM (Jan. 28, 2009)
http://www.techlawforum.net/internet-policy/net-law/griefers-online-worlds-torts/ (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
145. Girard, supra note 86.
146. Roderick Jones, Jailing Griefers, http://metasecurity.net12007/06/20/jailing-griefers/ (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
147. Kerr, supra note 16, at 425.
148. Mayer-Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1789 (noting that VWs share a permeable
boundary with the real, despite attempts to limit spill-over).
149. Kerr, supra note 16, at 417.
150. Id. at 419. But see Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 77 ("Injury is not a required element
of rape; the gravamen of the crime is non-consensual sexual intercourse. So if a Second Life avatar had sex with
another avatar without the latter's consent, it would presumably constitute rape under existing criminal
statutes.").
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actually happened, physically, is a series of offensive, disembodied digital
exchanges. The in-game injury is negligible. Nonetheless, the rape is
objectionable because from a virtual perspective the victim has suffered an
emotional harm-the victim's avatar and emotional integrity have been
attacked. "'
Griefing attacks always happen in-game, and always impact a real player to
some degree." 2 Thus, to determine whether an injury is internal or external, it
may be helpful to focus on the venue where the harm is primarily felt.'53
Returning to the example of virtual rape, the harm is sort of emotional assault. If
the harm is primarily felt in-game, then the harm is primarily internal and game
administrators are in the best position to regulate it.' 54 However, if we find instead
that the emotional trauma exists, legal action could be justified. 5
Injury alone cannot be the determinative factor in extending legal sanctions
to griefers. The distinction between internal and external harms unduly simplifies
the play conceit of VWs. These worlds are "play spaces"' 56 first and foremost,
and the possibility of legal action must be informed by the play conceit. A harm
that is consistent with the play conceit, however far it extends into the real world,
should not be an actionable harm. After determining there is an external injury
that game administrators are in no position to redress, the next step in extending
the law to griefing attacks should be to consider if the injury was inflicted in a
manner consistent with the rules of play. Griefing is generally a deviation from
the rules of play, yet injuries inflicted within these rules should not be legally
cognizable, regardless of whether they were inflicted by griefers.
B. The Magic Circle
The rules of play are often legally significant. What would otherwise be a
legal battery is only a jab between two competing boxers.157 The law treats the
boxer's punch differently than the brawler's out of respect for the "magic circle"
of the ring, and an agreement between the boxer and his opponent transcends
mutual combat to become play. The "magic circle" theory of play posits that
players establish the rules of a play space through shared expectations and
consent.5 8 The magic circle marks a boundary that players cross to reach the
151. DIBBELL, supra note 93, at 17 (describing the severe emotional trauma suffered by a victim of VW
"cyber rape").
152. See Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 55 ("[U]nless we decant our consciousnesses into
computer media and abandon the physical world, the conduct involved in committing a cybercrime 'in' a virtual
world cannot occur entirely in that virtual environment.").
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 305 (noting that VWs are primarily play spaces).
157. ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 63 (Cengage Learning 2002).
158. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 178-79.
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"special social and psychological space of a game." 59 Play that takes place within
the magic circle should be protected from the real world and vice versa, so the
rules of play often trump those outside the game. '60 Magic circle protection is
desirable for VWs, because it preserves the integrity of the play spaces, while at
the same time is flexible enough to protect "serious" conduct by incorporating it
into the rules of play.
In exchange for exposure to different rules, participants receive the benefits
of play.16' The rules of play vary between and within VWs. For example, player-
versus-player combat is the norm in most structured VWs, but generally
impossible in social VWs.162 In Second Life, combat is prohibited in public
areas. 163 An attack in a public space would violate the rules of play,' 64 which could
be a griefer's technique. However, consenting Second Life residents may access
private combat-enabled areas and battle to their hearts' content. 6 Thus, it may be
helpful to think of the VW's magic circle as a series of circles through which
players navigate.
The "magic circle" has been criticized as simplistic and binary.' 66 It is not the
distinction between play and non-play spaces that is significant, but rather, the
awkward liminal space between the two. Players must consent to play, and the
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magical circle is constantly in negotiation 1-a sort of contract that resonates
with the very nature of VWs. VWs are "play spaces" where the rules of play
temporarily supersede those of society.' 6 The lines of a VW's magic circle are
not as clear as the four comers of a boxing ring.' 69 In unstructured VWs, without
predetermined objectives, finding the play conceit is tricky. "Play" seems a poor
descriptor for much of what occurs in VWs.1 Players may use a VW for a
variety of reasons from socialization to business. 7' And yet, the magic circle is
largely a matter of expectation and consent. A player's expectations are informed
159. Juul, supra note 15.
160. Id.
161. Bartle, supra note 14, at 23.
162. See WOW TOS, supra note 58 9(C) ("[Pllayer-killing the enemies of your race and/or alliance,
including gravestone and/or corpse camping, is considered a part of the Game.").
163. See Community Standards, supra note 130 1 3 (stating that most areas in Second Life are "safe
areas" where combat is forbidden).
164. See id. (noting that pushing, shoving, or using persistent objects against another player in a safe
area constitutes assault, a violation of the Community Standards).
165. Second Life, Things to Do, http:llsecondlife.com/app/help/thingstodo/combat.php (last visited Apr.
14,2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
166. Juuls, supra note 15, at 58-60.
167. Marinka Copier, "Connecting Worlds. Fantasy Role-Playing Games, Ritual Acts and the Magic
Circle," Changing Views-Worlds in Play, DIGRA 2005 Conference, at 61-62, available at
htpp://www.digra.org/dl/db/06278.50594.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Griefing may be the
rough edges of this negotiation. Id.
168. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 305.
169. Kerr, supra note 16, at 421.
170. Balkin & Noveck, supra note 9, at 3.
171. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2044.
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by informal social norms, but also by the EULA, which they must consent to
before joining play. Thus, these contractual agreements are the nearest we can
come to explicitly outlining the diameter of the magic circle.'
Applying magic circle protection to games as unstructured as VWs is
challenging. The rules of play may not always be readily apparent from the
EULA. 173 Moreover, the values justifying legal regulation differ between VWs,
and any would-be regulator should be mindful of player expectations and
designer intent.'74A court called upon to consider magic circle protection could
apply the standard on a case-by-case basis. This standard would require
balancing the competing interests implicated by VWs. For example, Duranske
proposes that an "activity that occurs in a virtual world is subject to real-world
law if the user undertaking the activity reasonably understood, or should have
reasonably understood, at the time of acting, that the act would have real-world
implications."'75 This amounts to measuring the subjective intent of the actor. The
magic circle is, however, a boundary that players negotiate, and players must
always be aware of the implications play has for real life. Regardless of ill intent
or subjective awareness of the real-word implications of the act, the law has no
need to cross over if the act is consistent with the rules of play and the
expectations of the parties. To determine when a player is entitled to magic circle
protection, the player's interest in pursuing a legitimate in-game objective should
be balanced against the reasonable expectations of the injured party. The EULA
should be the barest version of both.
For example, if a VW's EULA promotes and protects economic activity, then
economic activity falls within the agreed-to rules of play. In this VW, a griefer
who attacks an economic activity has pursued an invalid in-game objective that is
inconsistent with the rules of play and the expectations of the players. The attack
would not be entitled to magic circle protection. Conversely, in a VW that
provides for the theft and destruction of virtual property, approving of these acts
through the rules of play, injuries to virtual property would not be actionable, but
rather would be "part of the rules of the game."' 76 Although such acts should
arguably cause a harm primarily felt outside the game (depending on the status of
virtual property and its dollar value), they occur in the context of shared
expectations and mutual consent. Therefore, these acts should be provided with
the protection of the magic circle, regardless of the player's subjective intent.
172. Kerr, supra note 16, at 422.
173. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 2066-67 (noting that many game spaces lack clear cut rules and that
in places where the EULA is silent, there is a gray area).
174. See id. at 2074 ("Virtual spaces that are 'noncommodified'-not in the sense that the owners do
not make money from them, but in the sense that they avoid real-world commodification-deserve different
treatment from legislatures than virtual spaces that are pathways for commerce. This distinction will protect the
ability of both the designers and the players to choose which kinds of worlds they want to create and inhabit.").
175. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 75.
176. Kerr, supra note 16, at 419.
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An approach that relies on the play conceit to distinguish between non-
cognizable and cognizable harms in VWs is consistent with how the law treats
play generally. Analogies to gambling provide examples where the rules of play
trump property interests.'" Courts defer to the rules of the game to determine
property interest in the context of a consensual card game.' To draw an analogy
to griefing, the malicious intent of a card player is not legally relevant so long as
he abides by the rules of the game. And yet, cheating in such a contest could be
considered a crime. In this instance, a player did not lose money as part of a
game he consented to, but rather through fraud or misrepresentation.' 79 By
analogy, a griefer who finds a way to damage in-game property in a way the play
conceit does not provide is a cheater. The harm he inflicts is not part of abiding
by the rules of the game, but exploiting them for a good, mean laugh.
Sports analogies also illustrate this dynamic. Generally, a football player who
suffers an injury during play has no cause of action against the other players,
even if the injury is crippling and the product of a foul.' 80 However, when a
player commits a foul with a deliberate intent to injure, there may be a cause of
action regardless.' 8' Hockey may be a rough game, but when Marty McSorley
infamously struck an opposing player in the head with his stick, the law pierced
the "magic circle" and reached the rink, because McSorley's actions deviated
from the "common practices and norms" of play.'82 Attacking a fellow player
with a hockey stick does not advance a valid in-game objective in a manner
consistent with the rules of play and is not something other players consent to.
If we understand VWs as play spaces, roughly analogous to a football field
or card table, griefing would be covered by these principles. There are, however,
gray areas. Griefing can be either like an unsportsmanlike, yet legally
insignificant tackle in football, or a unsportsmanlike and actionable attack with a
hockey stick. As previously noted, to determine when griefing crosses the line
from play to actionable harm, the alleged griefer's interest in pursuing a valid in-
game objective should be balanced against the interests and expectations of the
victim. Two well-known griefing attacks illustrate the challenges of this
balancing act.
In a popular VW, EVE Online, the griefer guild known as Goonswarm
destroyed a coveted and expensive in-game ship with a horde of weaker ships.'83
177. Id. at 420; see also Temple v. State, 215 S.W. 965 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919) (finding that a card
player who took his opponent's money did not commit theft if his opponent had been cheating).
178. Kerr, supra note 16, at 420.
179. Id. at 420-21.
180. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2068.
181. Id.
182. Kerr, supra note 16, at 421-22; see also Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516 (10th. Cir.
1979) (finding the defendant, a football player, could be held liable for injuries inflicted with a reckless
disregard for his opponent's safety when he struck a kneeling opposing player on the back of the neck, from
behind, after the play had ended).
183. Dibbell, supra note 2.
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The victims lost a valuable in-game resource, but the real injury seemed external
to the game. In a matter of hours, the Goonswarm destroyed virtual property that
took months of effort to acquire and was valued at roughly $10 ,0 00 .'14 EVE
Online's EULA explicitly disclaims any property interest and forbids RMTs,
therefore foreclosing a discussion on whether the destruction of the ship
constituted an economic injury.'85 Yet, even assuming the lost ship was property
entitled to legal protection, the attack occurred in a gray area of play. Unpleasant
as it may be, the attack should be protected by the magic circle
The griefing attack was connected to a legitimate in-game objective.'86 EVE
Online is designed to be ruthless and unforgiving, and the destruction of ships is
built into its' play conceit. ' The victims of the attack should have expected that
such attacks could occur in EVE Online, and they manifested consent to property
attacks by playing in the vicious environment of the VW. Thus, even if the harm
is not primarily external to the game, it is within the play conceit and cannot pass
the second criteria for legal liability. The lost value of the ship, and any attendant
emotional injury, must be trumped by the magic circle because the griefers were
fundamentally playing a game.
The specific details of the attack, if framed differently, might warrant a
different outcome. The Goonswarm used a series of disposable, low-power user
accounts to swarm and overwhelm their victims.'88 These accounts may have
been established with fraudulent personal information. Although it is a gray area,
this may constitute an abuse of game mechanics or an "exploit" in breach of the
EULA. 89 The swarming nature of the attack itself may also be susceptible to
description as an exploit, or violation of the rules of play. If the attack were an
exploit, then it would be analogous to cheating in cards, and magic circle
protection would not be warranted-the magic circle does not admit fraud and
misrepresentation; EVE may elevate fraud to a game. A player must advance a
valid in-game objective by legitimate means to claim magic circle protection.
However, even if it was a breach of the EULA, there would be a negligible injury
if the ship was not really property. The rules of play, hence the magic circle, in
EVE Online do not protect RMTs, and the only harm left is the emotional injury
184. Id.
185. EVE Online Support, EVE Online Policy on Online Auction Sites, http://support.eve-
online.com/Pages/KB/Article.aspx?id=30 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
186. EVE Online explicitly defines "grief play" as not advancing an in-game objective. Examples of
play-based griefing include significantly stronger players attacking weaker characters that pose them no threat.
Id.; see http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/banning.asphttp://support.eveonline.com/Pages/KB/Article.aspxid=336
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
187. Dibbell, supra note 2.
188. Id.
189. EVE Online, Terms of Service, http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/terms.asp (last visited Apr. 17,
2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). "You may not exploit any bug in EVE Online to gain an unfair
advantage over other players." Id.
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suffered while playing in the VW-far less attractive to litigate than a $10,000
loss.
A more challenging example of the pitfalls of the magic circle is the
infamous World of Warcraft "funeral bomb." '9° This griefing attack is noteworthy
for its cruelty, and for the frequency in which involved parties crossed the
uncertain threshold between VWs and real life. A young woman died, leaving
behind a World of Warcraft account and many grieving friends.' 9' The dead
woman's friends honored her memory by organizing a World of Warcraft funeral
for her. 92 The venue was the server she played on, a player-versus-player
environment where inter-player violence was the norm.' 93 The surrealism of a
funeral in World of Warcraft cannot be overstated. In World of Warcraft, avatar
killing is like catch and release fishing. A slain avatar loses nothing but the few
moments of time it takes to get back into the game.' 94 Still, few would argue that
the funeral was not a heartfelt gesture.
Mourners suspended their play and arrived at the funeral unarmed out of
respect to an avatar and the woman behind it who would no longer be playing.' 95
The funeral did not go as planned. Mourners were slaughtered by a group of
malcontents known as Serenity Now who had not forgotten they were playing on
a player-versus player server; the funeral site was a legitimate venue for player
killing.196
One could technically argue the attack was not a grief. The server was open
to player killing, and killing the mourners was a valid in-game objective.' 97 Under
the expectations of the EULA and informal social norms, the players should have
anticipated an attack. Mourning was not a valid game objective. And yet, the
attack was a grief in that it meets the necessary elements: it was an intentional
act, it caused other players to enjoy World of Warcraft less, and griefers enjoyed
it."' In-game, the harm was trivial-at worst the victims lost the few moments it
took them to resurrect. In the real world, many people were extremely distraught
over the attack. '99 The griefers advanced their player-versus-player objectives in a
manner not inconsistent with World of Warcraft's explicit rules regarding
190. For the curious, or callous, footage of the attack is available at YouTube, see Serenity Now Bombs
a World of Warcraft Funeral, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHJVolaC8pw (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
191. Gabe Graziani, Massacre in Winterspring: The Most Shocking Attack in WoW History!, PC
GAMER MAG. 80, July 2006 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 27-28 (describing how death in World of Warcraft
is routine and impermanent and results only in lost time).
195. Graziani, supra note 191, at 80.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 245.
199. Id.
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harassment,2°° yet inflicted a real-world harm anyway. It was arguably a grief
within the play conceit. Whether or not the harm was sufficient to sustain an
intentional infliction of emotional distress (lIED) claim is beside the point; the
harm was built into the game related expectations of the players, which were
momentarily suspended by the victims. Still, it is difficult to advance the
argument that the attack was motivated by play objectives when one considers
the griefers posted several gloating videos of the attack on-line.
C. Protecting Play
Any extension of legal liability to VW conduct must be carefully tailored
around the play conceit. Game designers currently enjoy sovereign control of
VWs and understandably recoil at the prospect of external regulation of their
environments.0 ' The imposition of legal rules may limit designers' freedom to
develop their worlds, transforming them from administrators into custodians.20 2 In
the context of VWs, this not an idle danger; absolute control of a VW allows
203designers to protect the game conceit and preserve the integrity of play spaces.
Legal regulation poses a challenge to VWs as play spaces-with unfettered
regulation, a VW "would be just another extension of the real world."2 °O4 The
more VWs are exposed to the law, the less desirable they are as play spaces."
And yet, griefing attacks make VWs less desirable as play spaces, especially
when they spill over into real-world harms. The law should preserve and protect
the integrity of the play conceit, but not at the expense of the players.
Some virtual harms transcend VWs. 206 When griefing attacks inflict a real-
world injury, there is presently nowhere for the victim to turn but the VW rules
of play. The current scheme of VW regulation does not adequately deter or
punish griefing attacks, let alone address their real-world harms. Developers have
a strong incentive to stop griefing and are best positioned to fight it before it
200. See generally Blizzard Support, Harassment Overview, http://us.blizzard.comsupport/article.xml
?locale=en_US&articleld=20455&pageNumber=-l&searchQuery=harassment+overview (last visited Apr. 17,
2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (classifying "other categories" of harassment with emphasis on
intent rather than specific language or physical harassment).
201. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2071.
202. Bartle, supra note 14, at 37.
203. Id. at 27.
204. Id.
205. See Mayer-Schonberger & Crowley, supra note 10, at 1820 ("The more liability imposed on
providers for enforcing real-world rules in their virtual worlds, the less these providers may be able to delegate
virtual world rulemaking to their participants. In turn, this inability to delegate reduces the attractiveness of such
virtual worlds."); see also John William Nelson, The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in
Virtual Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea, 41 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 281, 308-09 (2010).
206. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 2059 (acknowledging that virtual harms may affect those outside the
game).
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creates real-world injuries.2° Yet griefing remains a pervasive part of VWs.05 If
the rules of play cannot create order in VWs, or at least manage virtual deviants,
other rules may be necessary. These rules must be consistent with the rules of
play.
Some players may bristle at the notion that the magic circle of a VW could
be penetrated by the law.2 9 But griefing is often a deliberate departure from the
magic circle. 2'0 To claim a VW is just a play space, and then purposefully deviate
from the rules of play while invoking its protection, is no defense to the
extension of the law to VWs. 2' However, as the examples of Eve Online and
World of Warcraft illustrate, not all damaging or offensive conduct that players
would label as "griefing" violate the rules of play. In these instances, griefers
should be entitled to magic circle protection, however harmful or offensive their
actions, if they pursued legitimate in-game objectives in a manner not
inconsistent with the player's expectations under the EULA. The alternative
places intolerable burdens on VWs as play spaces. If a griefing attack results in
an external injury that is not entitled to the protection of the play conceit, the
extension of penalties and remedies associated with existing criminal and tort law
may be warranted.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Crimes Against Play
Legal liability is not inconsistent with the play conceit in VWs. Griefing is
the equivalent of "in-world crime," and may also constitute the elements of a
real-world crime.12 The play conceit does not presume to privilege play that
constitutes a substantive offense. For example, World of Warcraft explicitly
excludes "unlawful" activity from the play conceit by reserving it as grounds for
a ban.2t 3 World of Warcraft's play conceit assumes that criminal behavior never
furthers a legitimate in-game objective. Under these rules of play, there is no
207. Local Government, supra note 121.
208. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 186.
209. Id. at 62.
210. See id. at 193 ("When a user intentionally steps outside the magic circle (e.g., by circumventing the
game or virtual world's mechanical restrictions, or by flagrantly violating its terms of Service) in order to attack
another user ... [t]he defendant's cry of "it's just a game" rings hollow when the defendant willfully chooses
not to treat the world as a game in the first place.").
211. Id. at 62.
212. See Dan Hunter, Virtual Crime 101 (2003), http://terranova.blogs.com/terranova/2003/10/
virtualcrimeI.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). "Turns out that the main type of in-world crime
(we think) is griefing. Of course this can take many forms, depending on the nature of the world. But in general
it seems that crime [equals] griefing within world." Id.; see also DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 61 ("the intrusion
of real-world law means that [griefers] could be taken to court, in some cases even jailed, for some of the more
shockingly antisocial and cruel things that they do.")
213. WOW TOS, supra note 58, at $ 15.
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need for a specialized body of law to address griefing. Traditional principles of
criminal law may be applied to cyber-situated misconduct2 " and could lead to the
imposition of criminal liability for conduct in VWs."5 The novelty of the venue
of VWs alone should not preclude the application of law to VWs, especially
when VW activity inflicts unacceptable social harms.1 6 The question is then,
when can a griefing attack inflict enough social harm to warrant suspension of
the play conceit.
B. Community Harms: Obscenity
Much of the play in VWs is essentially speech,21 7 presumably even griefing.
Granted, it may seem a stretch to call it speech when griefers employ
pornographic or obscene images for their shock value, as they often do,2"s but
such judgment is more visceral than legal. Anti-obscenity statutes represent a
category of existing laws that criminalize harms inflicted upon morality.219 If
courts were to construe existing statutes criminalizing the display of obscenity to
extend to computers and VWs, griefer attacks may satisfy the elements of the
statutes. In theory, a griefer who posts obscenity could be criminally liable for
inflicting an injury to the public's morality. Yet, imposing criminal liability in
this situation is problematic.
Obscenity is a crime without individual harms; the injury is to the moral
sense of the community. 20 Thus, obscenity is measured by community standards
which have proven extraordinarily difficult to define in the context of the
Internet. What does seem clear is that under the current state of the law,
obscenity would be measured by the standards of a "real world community" and
not a virtual community.22' Those exposed to the obscene griefing attack are,
214. See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as "Virtual Crime"?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (2001)
(arguing that the principles used to impose liability for crimes can be extended to "cybercrimes" without the
need for additional bodies of law). But see id. at 121 ("We may decide to create a distinct law of cybercrimes
for social policy reasons because we believe that there are sound reasons specifically to denounce cyber-situated
misconduct.").
215. See DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 61 ("[T]he intrusion of real-world law means that [griefers]
could be taken to court, in some cases even jailed, for some of the more shockingly antisocial and cruel things
that they do.").
216. See Brenner, Virtual Crime, supra note 214, at 19 ("We must accept the possibility that
unacceptable social harms can be inflicted inside cyberspace and act accordingly .... when the need to do so
arises.").
217. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2053.
218. Reuters, supra note 87.
219. Brenner, Fantasy Crime, supra note 12, at 8.
220. Id. One might hesitate to explain this to the person exposed to the obscenity, however.
221. See Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (upholding a federal statute
regulating obscene material on the Internet that applied local community standards in determining obscenity,
even though an individual has no control over which geographic areas have access to the material). Ashcroft
rebuked the lower court's fears that the law "would effectively force all speakers on the Web to abide by the
'most puritan' community's standards." Id.; see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
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however, members of the virtual community. Inasmuch as a virtual community
has articulable community standards, they are the true context for the impact of
an obscene image in a VW. For example, pornographic material freely circulates
in Second Life and other VWs, 22' and Second Life's official Community
Standards provide a place for the arguably obscene. Such materials are
permissible in private areas rated "Mature. ' 23 Public spaces are required to
follow "PG" guidelines, and violators of this policy may be banned.
24
A specific injury may be unnecessary to sanction a griefer under an obscenity
statute,225 but just because griefing attacks may correspond to the elements of an
offense does not mean that criminal punishment is the ideal punitive response to
the attack. Game administrators are positioned to quickly respond to obscenity
based griefing attacks. For example, if Second Life administrators had difficulty
stopping the phallic thened attack on Anshe Chung as it progressed, they were at
least in the position to do something, in real time and within the framework of the
VW. Attempting to punish an obscene griefing attack through criminal charges
would send a powerful symbolic message, but not just to griefers. The deterrent
value could also chill desirable in-world activity, and courts should not usurp the
virtual community's role as arbiters of community standards. Despite the
shortcomings of in-world enforcement it seems best scaled to the potential injury
of a griefer's obscenity.
C. Individual Harms: Cyberbullying Statutes
"Cyberbullying" laws, essentially harassment or stalking statutes targeted at
electronic mediums, protect against individual harms. 6 Griefing is a specialized
sub-species of the cyberbullying genus. Thirteen states already have
cyberbullying laws of varying strictness, and more may follow.227 Cyberbullying
emerged in the public's consciousness with the sad case of Megan Meier, a teen
who committed suicide after being harassed on the social-networking site
877-78 (1997) ("[T]he 'community standards' criterion as applied to... a nation wide audience will be judged
by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.").
222. See Regina Lynn, Stroker Serpentine, Second Life's Porn Mogul, Speaks, WIRED MAG., Mar. 30,
2007, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/03/sexdrive0330 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the success and prevalence of virtual pornography in Second Life).
223. Community Standards, supra note 130, at 5.
224. Id.
225. See American Amusement Machine Assoc. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding no showing of harm necessary under an obscenity statute because "offensiveness [was] the offense").
226. See Cyberbullying, http://www.cyberbullying.us (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (defining "cyberbullying" as "willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of
computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices"); Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through
Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE LJ 42, 1 (Supp. 2007) (noting victims of cyberbullying, like victims of
griefing attacks, are generally left with no recourse).
227. Courtney Holliday, MySpace-Hoax Trial Shines Light on Federal Cyberbullying Bill, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20905 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law
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MySpace.228 In response, Congress drafted HR 6123, or The Megan Meier
Cyberbullying Prevention Act, which was introduced in May of 2008.229 The Act
is representative of the approach of these statutes. It provides that, "[w]hoever
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with the intent to
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person,
using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.' '230 The
Act's scope is broad enough to cover griefing attacks. In fact, it may be
unconstitutionally broad.231
Cyberbullying laws are designed to provide remedies for otherwise
unredressable injuries.232 The problem of reporting such injuries suggests they
may be better addressed through alternate forms of civil liability, perhaps under =
lIED suits, which would put the burden of action on the complainant, rather than
on regulatory bodies such as game administrators or states. The harms of
cyberbullying are felt outside the game, and in many instances, the pervasive
anonymity of the Internet makes it difficult to punish cyberbullies.233
General cyberbullying statutes are not properly suited to address griefing.
The griefing attack on the funeral illustrates that antagonistic behavior that is felt
outside of the game might be largely consistent with the game itself-the
expectations of the players are informed by the play conceit and are worlds away
from the users of a social networking site. Short of a game-related suicide or
similar calamity, it is hard to imagine a griefer-related attack inflicting an injury
that courts would attempt to redress under a cyberbullying statute.
D. Global Injuries: Denial of Service Attacks
The griefer's deadliest weapon, a denial of service attack, is an internet-
specific offense that requires no extension of existing laws; denial of service
attacks are already a federal crime under the National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act (the Act) of 1996 and are also outlawed in other jurisdictions.2M
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act (Introduced in House), H.R. 1966, 1lth Cong.
§ 881(a) (2009).
231. Eugene Volokh, The Crime of Severe, Repeated, and Hostile Communication with the Intent to
Cause Substantial Emotional Distress?, http:/lvolokh.corn-postsl1212694919.shtrnl (last visited Mar. 8, 2009)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
232. See Holliday, supra note 227 (noting that, according to the Act's author, the absence of federal law
criminalizing cyberbullying means cyberbullies go unpunished).
233. Areheart, supra note 226, at 1.
234. Joseph Lo, Denial of Service or "Nuke Attacks", http://www.irchelp.orglirchelp/nuke/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Tom Esponer, U.K. Outlaws Denial-of-Service
Attacks, CNET NEWS, May 11, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/2100-7348_3-6134472.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing a provision of the Police and Justice Bill 2006 as making it "an offense to
impair the operation of any computer system" punishable by up to ten years imprisonment).
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Under the Act, it is a crime to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause
damages to a protected computer provided that the damages exceed $5,000 over
a one year period or aggregate over $5,000 to multiple computers over a one year
period . 35 In a VW with a vibrant synthetic economy like Second Life, it is not a
stretch to imagine potentially larger damages resulting from a denial of service
attack. Game administrators loathe to involve outside regulators in their VWs,
but they are quick to reach out to the law in response to denial of service attacks.
Second Life's administrators turned over customer information to the FBI in the
wake of a series of denial of service attacks, and requested legal intervention. 2 6 A
denial of service prosecution would be a useful, if not symbolic, tool for
punishing griefers, and it poses no challenges to the play conceit.
E. Property Attacks
Griefing attacks also implicate statutes penalizing property crimes. Griefing
attacks that target the money behind VWs have obvious legal implications.237 In
Second Life, griefers take advantage of a "razor thin disclaimer" in the TOS that
distinguishes between real dollars and the fictional, yet valuable, in-game
currency.238 One griefer credited this disclaimer as all that kept him from a ride in
"the FBI party van.
239
Recognizing virtual property rights would conceivably criminalize most
property-based griefing attacks. Many commentators have called for legal
protection for virtual chattels.rt Others have focused on guarding against the
theft of virtual chattels.24' Griefing attacks may be analogous to theft, vandalism,
or trespass. As previously noted, many VWs require players to agree they have
no rights to property as a condition of participation. 42 The enforceability of these
agreements is an unresolved question,243 though they may ultimately prove
enforceable. Other VWs, like Second Life, may recognize property interests in
their players: intellectual property rights.2 No court has ruled on the status of
virtual property or the general validity of such agreements. Developers have
235. 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(4)
236. Reuters, supra note 87.
237. See Dibbell, supra note 2 ("Once real money is at stake, 'serious business' starts to look a lot like,
well, serious business, and messing with it starts to take on buzz-killing legal implications.").
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally Alfred Fritzsche, Trespass to (Virtual) Chattels, 8 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 235 (2007)
(arguing for a cause of action of trespass to virtual chattels for game administrators who threaten RMT activity)
241. See generally Andrea Vanina Arias, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and Armor:
Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301 (2008) (arguing the theft of virtual goods should be
legally cognizable).
242. WOW TOS, supra note 58 i 2-7 (reserving all rights and title to in-game content, including
objects).
243. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2070.
244. See Second Life TOS, supra note 129, at 13.2.
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strong objections to extending property interests to players, noting that it makes
developers custodians, not game designers, and limits their control over the
environments they design. 5 Some jurisdictions are open to protecting virtual
property. For example, a Dutch teen was arrested for the theft of virtual chattel-
and there are comparable instances of criminal prosecution related to VWs in
other countries.2 The few people in United States jurisdictions who have tried to
invoke legal protection for virtual property have not found relief. One
unfortunate player of Final Fantasy who lost in-game property worth $4,000 went
to the police, only to be told that no crime had been committed because virtual
property was not property.
If courts prove willing to treat virtual property as equivalent to real or
personal property, many griefing attacks could be the functional and legal
equivalent of vandalism. Vandalism "consists of knowingly damaging or
destroying real or personal property owned by someone else without having that
person's consent to do so.''248 For example, the infamous griefing attack on John
Edwards' Second Life headquarters was literally damaging, if only in a VW.49
Moreover, denial of service attacks may be framed as vandalism in that they
damage the functional aspect of a web property, such as a VW in general at the
macro level.25°
So long as the vandalism act occurs outside the magic circle of the game and
results in identifiable damages, the only thing preventing the application of the
law is the unsettled nature of the property.
F. Viability
The enforcement of criminal law against griefers presents a host of practical
problems. As a tool for social control, criminal law is at best a blunt instrument,2
and it may be poorly suited for making the fine distinctions that the play conceit
of VWs require. Moreover, monitoring VWs would place a tremendous burden
on the State and the VW, without leading to significant enforcement. The
245. BARTLE, supra note 39, at 3.
246. 'Virtual Theft' Leads to Arrest, BBC NEWS, Nov. 14, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/
7094764.stm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Note that in this instance, the "theft of chattel" could be
characterized as an actual theft, or credit fraud. Kerr, supra note 16, at 423.
247. Andrew Gioia, Virtual Worlds: Real Theft?, http:/lblog.mttlr.org/200/l10(virtual-worlds-real-
theft.html (last visited Dec. 25, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
248. Brenner, Virtual Crime, supra note 214, at 69.
249. See Fass, supra note 89 (describing how vandals defaced former senator John Edwards' Second
Life headquarters).
250. See Brenner, Virtual Crime, supra note 214, at 75 ("In the virtual world, property can be a
dynamic concept, as in the case of a web site which offers services or information to the public; in this context,
vandalism also encompasses conduct that is designed to damage or destroy the dynamic, functional aspect of
web property.").
251. Kerr, supra note 16, at 428.
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investigatory and jurisdictional challenges of policing VWs cannot be
overstated. 2
The responses to these investigatory and regulatory challenges may not be
desirable. Criminal penalties have a chilling effect on socially desirable activities
that may border on criminal.253 Although criminal acts are not entitled to magic
circle protection, some activities that fall in gray areas of play may be
discouraged. Still, it is not inconceivable that specific acts of griefing may
require legal action, especially if the attack satisfies the elements of a substantive
criminal offense that transcends the VW, such as in a denial of service attack.
VII. TORT LIABILITY AND GRIEFING
A. Griefing: In-World Tort
In many VWs, the rules of play anticipate real-world legal disputes may
arise. Second Life's TOS provides that in-game dispute resolution is not a legal
judgment, and any dispute resolution has no bearing on "real-world legal
disputes.,,254 The TOS preserves the possibility that in-game disputes between
players may be settled by real-world law and makes explicit reference to torts as
grounds for a ban.255 If the EULA is the barest sketch of the magic circle, then
torts are explicitly beyond the play conceit. It requires little imagination to frame
griefing as a tort.256 In VWs where the EULA promotes property interests, the
rules of play are violated when a player attacks these property interests.
Moreover, inasmuch as VWs are social spaces and games, communication torts
should not fall within the play conceit.
Redressing griefing attacks does not require novel law, but rather the
extension of existing laws. Computer-mediated torts may be treated by existing
tort principles. Broadly, the rationales for tort law are not changed by the
environment of VWs. Tort law is a source of deterrence and compensation; the
threat of compensation informs the strength of deterrence. 5s Tort deters the
affluent, not the judgment proof,2 9 and the nearly anonymous griefers would
seem functionally, if not technically, judgment proof. If tort serves as an
252. See id. at 427-28 (noting the potential options for policing online activity, such as fines or criminal
law).
253. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1206
(1985).
254. Second Life TOS, supra note 129, at 15.
255. Id.
256. See Schmidt, supra note 144 (speculating that Second Life may experience in world tort claims).
257. See Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to
Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (arguing that, although cyberspace torts are novel there "is no need for
a special field of cybertort law").
258. Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV.
215, 217 (1996).
259. Posner, supra note 253, at 1205.
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adequate deterrence to conduct, then criminal penalties are unnecessary.W Tort
liability comes with a price: it may discourage otherwise beneficial acts. If there
is social utility in conduct that causes harm, the activity should be encouraged. 26'
Griefing itself has minimal social utility, but the play in VWs has a high social
utility. To stifle the former without deterring the latter, courts should focus on the
play conceit if asked to consider a VW tort.
262Torts generally belong to one of two classes: personal and property attacks.
Both classes apply in VWs. Personal torts are not limited to bodies, but extend to
reputational or emotional injuries.263 that may be harmed in VWs. The law may
redress either, through defamation or lIED theories. If virtual property is
recognized as something independent of intellectual property, tort protection
would also apply to virtual property.' 6 Tort actions against griefers could either
be framed as an intentional tort by the griefer, or the tort of negligence against a
game administrator.
B. Suits Against Griefers
Griefing attacks seem very much like intentional torts. Intentional torts focus
on the ends, not the means; the actor derives pleasure from the harmful
consequences of the act, as opposed to the act itself265 A griefer intends to upset
and humiliate his victim when he acts. Returning to the unfortunate example of
Anshe Chung, griefers did not disrupt her interview with digital genitalia just for
the sake of disruption. Rather, they acted for the anticipated consequence:
Chung's humiliation and embarrassment. Griefing attacks are generally defined
by a conscious intent.26 The question is, when is intent justification for legal
liability?
1. Tort Protection for Virtual Property
Some courts have applied trespass law to online activity in the context of
servers and e-mail.267 If virtual land is a legally cognizable property interest, then
a griefer who enters another virtual land has committed trespass. Granted, in
VWs there will be many instances of players accidentally or intentionally
260. Id. at 1204.
261. See Hylton, supra note 257, at 16 ("If society is made better off, after all, by the very activity that
causes injury, that activity should be encouraged.").
262. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 3 (2009).
263. Id.
264. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 186.
265. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 58 (2008).
266. Foo & Koivisto, supra note 67, at 246.
267. See generally Sotelo v. Direct Revenue, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (N.D. I11. 2005) (applying trespass
elements to computers); CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (applying
trespass elements online).
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intruding on otherwise private areas. Under the standards of the Restatement, the
remedy available would be limited by the harm inflicted.2'6 Thus, a virtual hobo
who wanders into another's property inflicts de minimis injury that is not worth
litigating. However, the griefers who bombed John Edwards's campaign
headquarters may have done something worth fighting over. Moreover, if
virtual land is economically productive, in the cases of rents or business, then
griefing attacks that interfere with that business may amount to a "seizure" and
be recoverable. Ultimately, this would only be a speculative approach, given
the unsettled status of virtual property, and the jurisdictional difficulties of an
online tort are beyond the scope of the current law and this Comment's inquiry.
2. Griefing as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The goal of a griefer is to distress his victims, and so RED seems an obvious
fit for griefing attacks.271 Yet, it bears remembering that "[there] is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt. '7  The
law only intervenes when the hurt is so intense that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.273 Thus, HED claims are purposefully difficult and must
274
meet a threshold test for outrageousness. Following the Restatement, the
conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. ' 27 Demonstrating the outrageousness of a
griefing attack seems intuitively straightforward-if it fails to outrage, it is not a
griefing attack. Yet, what constitutes "outrageousness" in a VW community is a
complicated, fact-sensitive inquiry, further confused by the free speech concerns
at play in VWs.276 RED may only fit for the most egregious cases, "wildly outside
the [typical] forms of mistreatment., 277 Regardless of these problems, IED is the
most natural tort extension to griefing.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 cmt. C (1979) ("If the subject matter is land, the remedy
may be by an action of tort for the amount of harm done to the land ....").
269. See Fass, supra note 89 (describing vandals defacing former senator John Edward's Second Life
headquarters).
270. See id. (stating that, in instances where land is "seized" and then regained, actions for the "value of
the use of the land during the period of the detention" are appropriate).
271. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 62; Balkin, supra note 31, at 2068.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1969).
273. Id.
274. DURANSKE, supra note 63, at 186.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
276. Balkin, supra note 31, at 2068-69.
277. Id. at 2069.
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lIED claims may fall under a recklessness standard , which is not a good fit
for the magic circle of VWs. Consider Serenity Now's "funeral bomb" attack.
The griefers arguably pursued a valid in-game objective, 279 albeit with reckless
indifference to the consequences of their attacks. If we characterize such attacks
as "unlawful" or harassing, they would fall outside World of Warcraft's rules of
play, and the game has already built in space for liability.80 Yet, many VWs
encourage their players to disregard the in-game objectives of rival players.
Pursuing a valid in-game objective, which is necessarily adverse to other players,
should not give rise to tort liability, regardless of a griefer's malicious intent. To
do otherwise erases the magic circle. Ultimately, a test for outrageousness must
measure whether lIED is outrageous in the norms of play.
3. Viability
A lawsuit against the functionally anonymous griefer behind a disposable
avatar in one of the many jurisdictions connected by VW may be quite an
unpleasant chore.28' It is not impossible, however, for VWs to gather information
on misbehaving players. In the example of Second Life, Linden Labs has proven
willing to turn over customer identification and records for the purpose of
identifying griefers who launched denial of service attacks. 282 But even if an
individual griefer can be identified, he may prove judgment proof and legal
action may be prohibitively costly.2 3 Game administrators would make attractive
and obvious targets for tort suits. Legal action against game administrators,
however, fails for reasons of its own.
278. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965) (stating that an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is satisfied by recklessness); see also Shults v. U.S., 995 F. Supp. 1270,
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distress under Mississippi law).
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783 (1984) (finding California jurisdiction appropriate in a libel action arising out of intentional conduct in
Florida that was allegedly calculated to cause injuries in California). Note that the anonymous nature of VWs
may complicate the effects test of jurisdiction and that the Calder test may be difficult to apply to VWs. See
also Young v. New Haven, 315 F.3d 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding the mere posting of a comment on a
website insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction without purposeful targeting of the forum state).
282. Sellers, supra note 53.
283. See Areheart, supra note 226, at 1 (discussing the procedural difficulties of suits against
cyberbullies, or internet based tort suits).
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C. Third Party Tort Liability for Game Providers
Under a theory of negligence, an alternate target of a tort suit may not be the
griefer himself, but rather the game administrators.24 A player may assert that the
game administrators negligently coded and regulated a VW in such a manner to
allow a griefing attack to inflict an injury. For example, it is not impossible to
imagine Anshe Chung arguing that Linden Labs was negligent in the attack on
her interview.
Chung's hypothetical argument is consistent with general principles of third-
party liability. A party that is positioned to redress another's bad acts through
exercising control, or capable of passing on costs associated with liability and
thus impacting activity levels, may be subject to liability for the acts of a third-
party.285 VWs satisfy both criteria. Game administrators exercise control over
their environments through coding and contracts.286 By maintaining the sole
power of exclusion they are the only actors postured to impact activity levels.
However, if griefing is an inevitable fact of VW life that frustrates earnest
attempts at regulation, punishing the providers for the inevitable conduct of a few
rogue players would be inappropriate. From a practical standpoint, a tort action
over griefing must confront the problem of causation. Providers may argue they
should not be held responsible for the deliberate acts of third parties, especially if
the acts are in violation of rules they have established. The intervening acts of a
third party will not absolve a defendant of negligence liability if the plaintiff
relied on the defendant to take preventative steps or the defendant failed to
protect the plaintiff even though they were capable of it.287 Liability for griefing
may be arguable under either theory, considering the in-world role VW
administrators assume. The nature of VWs makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
avoid the harms of griefing. Moreover, EULAs and TOS contracts could offer
remedies for griefing attacks. They do not.
Even if game administrator liability would protect players, it also seems
certain to make VWs less attractive play spaces,2 s where the freedom to play will
be circumscribed to avoid liability. The competitive dynamics of VWs and the
uncertainty of jurisdiction may compromise the effectiveness of real-world law in
VWs.2 9 In any event, suing a game administrator is ultimately speculative. Under
284. Pixeleen Mistral, Dreamland Accuses LL of Aiding & Abetting Griefers!!!, ALPHAVILLE HERALD,
Nov. 13, 2007, http://foo.secondlifeherald.comi/slh/2007/1 l/dreamland-accus.htm (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (Anshe Chung's Second Life business sent patrons a notice urging a class action law suit against
Linden Labs to motivate Linden Labs to do something about griefers).
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providers over users through the active marketing of their regulatory frameworks and the competition between
lawmakers over attracting revenue-generating corporations to their jurisdictions-may diminish the ability of
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current federal law, a provider like Linden Labs or Blizzard Entertainment could
not be held liable for a third parties communication-based griefing because the
CDA effectively immunizes Internet Service Providers from tort liability. The
CDA was passed in 1996 to regulate pornographic material on the Internet, but
section 230 added sweeping protection for Internet companies, directing, "No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.''2* Due to the liberal judicial interpretation of section 230, acts under
the CDA receive greater immunity than possible under traditional tort law. 9'
Under the Communications Decency Act (CDA), Internet publishers are not
treated like other publishers for vicarious liability claims. 2  Thus, under the
present law, a victim of griefing would have no claim against the game providers,
who may arguably be in the best position technically and financially to redress an
in-game injury.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The economic and social values of VWs deserve more protection than the
current regime of self-governance affords. The need for greater protection is
illustrated by griefing attacks that lead to real-world injuries. Yet, defending
against griefer attacks is more a matter of respecting the rules of play than
extending legal principles into the play. VWs are games, however, and should
remain so lest they become "just another extension of the real world. 2 93 If a real-
world injury occurs in the play space of a VW, regulators should balance the
competing values of protection and play by weighing a player's interest in
pursuing a legitimate game objective against the other player's reasonable
expectations of conduct under the EULA. Doing so will help to draw a line
between rough play and spoiling play and maintain the integrity of VWs as play
spaces. But even then, the available legal remedies or causes of action must be
tailored around the play conceit. To do otherwise is to spoil play and to be the
envy of griefers.
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